Assalmu Alykum! In our previous article (on Kalam), we were able to establish the historical background of rise of philosophy and it's peak was seen as Ar-Razi's preference of reason over revelation. As evident from title, let's now explore the Ibn Taymiyya's counter arguments against Razi's rulings.

The Child is Born

The chaotic intellectual climate into which Ibn Taymiyya was born was matched by the political uncertainty and fragmentation of his times. Born in the city of Harran, Ibn Taymiyya’s family fled south-west to Damascus before the westward advance of the Mongols. After fleeing Harran, the Taymiyya family settled in the Ḥanbalī quarter of Damascus, where Ibn Taymiyya’s father served as the director of the Sukkariyya Ḥanbalī madrasa. Ibn Taymiyya eventually succeeded his father as director of the Sukkariyya madrasa and gave his first public lesson there at just twenty-one years of age. (See al-ʿUqūd al-durriyya)

Ibn Taymiyya was a bold and formidable debater as well, which, coupled with the enormous range and depth of his erudition, guaranteed that he rarely, if ever, lost a debate. (ʿUqūd, 10)

All told, over the course of his sixty-five years of life, Ibn Taymiyya was summoned to trial nine times, exiled twice (from Damascus to Cairo, then from Cairo to Alexandria), twice ordered to desist from giving fatwās, and imprisoned on six separate occasions for a total duration of more than six years. (Historical and Historiographical Significance, p. 313)

Ibn Taymiyya’s first step into political life was when a Christian named ʿAssāf (“ʿAssāf al-Naṣrānī”) was alleged to have publicly insulted the Prophet Muḥammad. Ibn Taymiyya and another shaykh brought the matter to the attention of the viceroy (nāʾib al-salṭana), who summoned ʿAssāf to a hearing. A public disturbance ensued, whereupon the viceroy had the two shaykhs flogged and briefly detained. (Bidāya,17:665)

The next time, Ibn Taymiyya wrote one of his most famous statements of creed, al-Fatwā al-Ḥamawiyya al-kubrā, which was hostile to Ashʿarī theology and to kalām in general. Ibn Taymiyya’s opponents from among the mutakallimūn accused him of anthropomorphism on account of this creed, whereupon he was summoned to questioning at the homeof the Shāfiʿī qāḍī Jalāl al-Dīn [also known as Imām al-Dīn] b. ʿUmar al Qazwīnī (d. 739/1338). After a close review of the text of the Ḥamawiyya and Ibn Taymiyya’s detailed explication of it during this session, he was acquitted of all charges and permitted to continue his teaching and writing. He was also spokeperson for Damascus of the resistance party in Damascus sent to negotiate with the Īlkhān Ghazan. Ibn Taymiyya also fought at the battle of Shaqḥab.

Soon Ibn Taymiyya found himself at the center of theological controversy. He sent a letter to Shaykh Naṣr al-Manbijī, a prominent follower of Ibn ʿArabī, challenging the rising influence of mystical monism. At the same time, his own doctrinal stance in al-ʿAqīda al-Wāsiṭiyya, came under Ashari doubts. A series of councils convened in Damascus to assess the creed, with mixed outcomes: while some scholars affirmed its alignment with Islamic scripture, others reignited opposition. Eventually, both Ibn Taymiyya and his critic, Judge Ibn Ṣaṣrā (who reopned the case), were exiled to Cairo, where Ibn Taymiyya faced yet another inquiry this time before the highest ranks of the Mamluk elite and was convicted.

Following his conviction for promoting anthropomorphic views, Ibn Taymiyya was imprisoned in Cairo’s citadel for eighteen months. Though eventually released, he was barred from returning to Syria. During his time in Cairo, he remained outspoken against practices he deemed bidʿa (reprehensible innovations), drawing criticism from prominent Sufi figures like Ibn ʿAṭāʾ Allāh al-Iskandarī (read about Shādhilī order in our article: Rihla) and Karīm al-Dīn al-Āmulī. His rejection of tawassul (the act of seeking intercession through saints) was especially controversial, as he viewed it as a form of shirk (idolatry). Summoned before a Shāfiʿī judge to explain his stance, Ibn Taymiyya was acquitted and granted permission to return to Syria, yet remained imprisoned for several more months.

The new Mamluk Rukn al-Dīn Baybars al-Jāshnikīr, a disciple of the Sufi shaykh Naṣr al-Manbijī made sultan’s alignment with the Sufi forces that Ibn Taymiyya had directly opposed led to a new round of recriminations against him. Ibn Taymiyya was arrested and exiled to Alexandria, where he was imprisoned for seven months in the tower of the sultan’s palace. During this period, he wrote several important works, most notably his Kitāb al-Radd ʿalā al-manṭiqiyyīn (Refutation of the logicians), soon he was released and went back to Cairo.

Ibn Taymiyya once again stirred controversy by issuing a legal opinion that contradicted the consensus of all four Sunni schools including his own Ḥanbalī school arguing that a triple divorce pronounced in one sitting counted only as a single repudiation if not intended otherwise. The sultan ordered him to cease such fatwās, but Ibn Taymiyya persisted, leading to a third council and a five-month imprisonment in Damascus.

His final major clash came in 726/1326, when he was arrested for his treatise al-Risāla fī ziyārat al-qubūr wa-l-istinjād bi-l-maqbūr, which condemned the practice of seeking intercession at the graves of saints (awliyāʾ). This time, opposition came from two powerful judges—Taqī al-Dīn al-Ikhnāʾī and ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn al-Qūnawī, a follower of Ibn ʿArabī. Ibn Taymiyya remained imprisoned for two years, during which he continued to write, even penning a rebuttal against al-Ikhnāʾī. Eventually, the sultan ordered that he be denied access to writing materials. Five months later, on 20 Dhū al-Qaʿda 728 / 26 September 1328, Ibn Taymiyya died in his cell silenced, but not forgotten.

Reasons For Writing Darʾ taʿāruḍ

Darʾtaʿāruḍ al-ʿaql wa-l-naql is a work of Ibn Taymiyya in efforts for reconciliation of reason (ʿaql) and transmitted knowledge (naql) in Islamic thought. It addresses how rational inquiry and religious texts can coexist without conflict.

His legal and theological outlook was firmly rooted in the methodology of ahl al-ḥadīth, favoring textual authenticity over speculative reasoning (ahl al-raʾy), and upholding the legacy of Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal.

Central to his thought was the belief that revelation and reason, when properly applied, could never conflict. He favoured qiyās (analogical reasoning) grounded in sound ijtihād, while rejecting the Aristotelian syllogism that had infiltrated later kalām through thinkers like al-Ghazālī. Although he did not dismiss kalām entirely, he drew a sharp line between its orthodox (sunnī) and heterodox (bidʿī) forms.

Deeply aware of the philosophical shifts introduced by Avicenna and adopted by later Ashʿarī theologians, Ibn Taymiyya determined to construct a theology based on the Qurʾān and Sunna, yet intellectually robust enough to engage with the philosophical tradition.

Ibn Taymiyya’s writing is down to earth, pragmatic, and to the point. Though he often deals with themes of extraordinary complexity (particularly in a work as philosophically involved as the Darʾ taʿāruḍ), it is clear that his intention was to write in a manner accessible to the average man.

Ibn Taymiyya’s theological framework begins with a firm commitment to the legacy of the Salaf (the earliest generations of Muslims) whom he regards as the most authoritative interpreters of divine truth. He asserts that the Salaf unanimously affirmed all attributes of God as revealed in scripture, with their plain and literal meanings without resorting to taʾwīl (figurative interpretation) or tafwīḍ (suspension of meaning).

He further contends that the Salaf not only rejected emerging negationist views particularly those associated with Jahm b. Ṣafwān but also actively defended affirmationism through both rational argument and scriptural evidence. When the Muʿtazila later advanced their views, the leading scholars of the Salaf swiftly condemned them.

He notes that opposition to the Muʿtazila initially upheld the idea that God’s attributes including speech and action subsist within Him and are subject to His will. However, this consensus shifted with Ibn Kullāb and his followers, who introduced a distinction between God’s essential attributes (like life and knowledge, intrinsic to His essence) and volitional attributes (such as speech and action, contingent upon divine will). Ibn Taymiyya viewed this development as a departure from the unified affirmationist theology of the early community.

After Kullab, Ibn Taymiyya ascribes to al-Ashʿarī (the founder of Ashari Creed) two specific shortcomings that, while easily overlooked in al-Ashʿarī’s own doctrine, he planted the seeds for an eventual major problems in the centuries that followed. The first shortcoming concerns al-Ashʿarī’s knowledge of the details of the Sunna.

And second, Ibn Taymiyya maintains that al-Ashʿarī spent so many years immersed in Muʿtazilī thought that he was unable to extricate himself from it fully. As a result, he unknowingly retained in his own doctrine what Ibn Taymiyya calls“remnants of the principles of the Muʿtazila.” (Darʾ,7:462)

Yet Ibn Taymiyya’s assessment of the early Ashʿarī school (that of the mutaqaddimūn) and its main authorities is over-whelmingly positive. After mentioning these early Ashʿarī masters, he says of them collectively: "There is not one among them who has not made praise worthy efforts and performed meritorious actions for the sake of Islam and engaged in refuting many of those [who call to] heresy and innovation and rallied to the defense of many [who uphold] the Sunna and [true] religion." (Darʾ,2:102)

Further says Ibn Taymiyya, that with each successive generation of Ashʿarīs, we find ever increasing misgivings about one after another of the attributes predicated of God in revelation. These misgivings arise from alleged rational objections that al-Ashʿarī himself did not catch but that later thinkers uncovered, as later followers think up ever more numerous and sophisticated rational arguments to support their founder’s initial doctrine.

In this manner, says Ibn Taymiyya, al-Ashʿarī himself and his immediate successor, al-Bāqillānī, unambiguously affirmed the so-called revealed attributes (al-ṣifāt al-khabariyya), to the point that “those who transmitted his doctrine (madhhab) were not in dispute over [this].” (Darʾ,5:248)

However, just two generations after al-Bāqillānī, Ibn Taymiyya tells, al-Juwaynī negated such attributes, “in agreement with [the doctrine of] the Muʿtazila and the Jahmiyya.” (5:249)

By the fifth/eleventh century, Ibn Taymiyya observes that al-Ghazālī vacillated in his treatment of the “rational attributes” (al-ṣifāt al-ʿaqliyya), sometimes affirming them in line with Ashʿarī theology, and at other times either denying them entirely or collapsing them into the singular attribute of knowledge, reflecting the influence of philosophical doctrine.

By the sixth/twelfth and seventh/thirteenth centuries, leading Ashʿarī theologians al-Rāzī and al-Āmidī had grown deeply agnostic about the nature and knowability of the divine attributes described in scripture. Their skepticism extended so far that they questioned whether revelation could yield any certain (yaqīn) knowledge, even in core theological matters. As a result, they ultimately concluded that no definitive rational or scriptural proof existed for either affirming or denying the divine attributes. (Darʾ,5:249)

Indeed, Ibn Taymiyya observes, al-Āmidī's saying: "I applied myself assiduously to the study of kalām but did not acquire anything [reliable] from it that differs from what the common people believe." (3:263)

As for philosophers, Ibn Taymiyya sharply criticizes the philosophers for their extreme negationism, which he sees as paving the way for Ibn ʿArabī’s doctrine of waḥdat al-wujūd (unity of being). He reserves his strongest condemnation for the Bāṭiniyya, particularly the Ismāʿīlīs, whose theology, in his view, is so radically negative that it refuses to affirm or deny anything about God including His very existence. This, Ibn Taymiyya argues, results in a deeply incoherent theology aimed at avoiding any resemblance (tashbīh) between God and creation. He also targets the “materialist pseudo-philosophers” like Ibn Sīnā and al-Fārābī, who reject the possibility of bodily resurrection on rational grounds. When challenged by Muʿtazilī theologians who affirm resurrection, these philosophers respond by pointing out the inconsistency: if the Muʿtazila deny divine attributes using rational arguments, they should, by the same logic, deny resurrection thus exposing a philosophical tension within rationalist theology itself. (Darʾ,5:250)

Ibn Taymiyya believed that despite the rise of speculative theology and philosophical deviation, a steadfast group—comprising many scholars and the majority of ordinary believers continued to uphold and rationally defend the original understanding of revelation passed down by the earliest generations of Muslims. This group, he claimed, included most ḥadīth scholars and legal jurists, and even al-Ashʿarī himself, though not his later followers, exemplified by al-Rāzī and al-Āmidī. He especially revered Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal, and his use of valid rational arguments in theological debate, and positioned himself as a loyal heir to this tradition committed to defending the creed of the Salaf with both scripture and reason. (Darʾ, 7:155)

Ibn Taymiyya was not the first Muslim thinker to confront the tension between reason and revelation, but he sought to resolve it on a grand and definitive scale. Earlier efforts had been made by theologians like al-Ghazālī and al-Rāzī through kalām, and by philosophers such as Ibn Sīnā and Ibn Rushd.

Ibn Taymiyya critiques these philosophers especially Ibn Sīnā and Ibn Rushd for their shared view that revelation speaks in symbolic, not literal, terms on metaphysical and theological matters. They saw its primary function as moral and political, not epistemic, and believed it was tailored to guide the common folk, while true knowledge was reserved for the philosophical elite through rational inquiry. Moreover, they criticized theologians (mutakallimūn) for confusing the masses by publicly engaging in figurative reinterpretation of scripture.

Ibn Taymiyya’s response, particularly in his Darʾ al-Taʿāruḍ, challenges this philosophical view and defends a theology rooted in the clarity and authority of revelation.

Ibn Rushd criticizes al-Ghazālī for sharing too much philosophy with the public and for explaining verses in a symbolic way that could confuse people. He believed such deep ideas should be kept from the masses.

Ibn Taymiyya says Ibn Rushd followed the path of hidden (esoteric) philosophers who think ordinary people should only follow the clear meaning of scripture. He wasn’t part of the Shīʿa group that openly rejected Islamic rules, but Ibn Taymiyya thought his denial of God’s attributes was even worse than that of the Muʿtazila.

As for al-Ghazālī, Ibn Taymiyya respects his knowledge and spiritual depth. Still, he believes al-Ghazālī accepted too many ideas from the philosophers, making him a middle figure between them and regular Muslim scholars.

For philosophers like Ibn Sīnā and Ibn Rushd, reason not revelation is the main way to know what is true or real in the world. Human reason, according to Aristotle (and thus Ibn Rushd), is best used to discover truth through logical thinking and structured argument. Deep truths about existence aren't easily revealed to everyone they're complex and subtle. Only a few gifted philosophers, like the Peripatetics, can reach certain knowledge through careful reasoning. This knowledge is rare and should be protected from those who can't grasp it. These philosophers believe revelation isn’t giving literal truth, but it use powerful symbols to represent deeper realities. These images may not be factually accurate, but they inspire people to live morally and prepare for the afterlife.

Ibn Taymiyya aligns with al-Ghazālī and arguably al-Rāzī in their skepticism toward the Greek model of rationality, which had been eagerly embraced by many among the Muslim intellectual elite. His work in Darʾ seeks to dismantle what he sees as a narrow and ultimately flawed conception of reason, doing so even more radically than al-Ghazālī himself. However, Ibn Taymiyya criticizes al-Ghazālī for abandoning the idea of a shared, reliable rationality and for grounding certainty in personal spiritual experience, which he views as subjective.

Unlike al-Ghazālī, Ibn Taymiyya shares the philosophers’ including Ibn Sīnā and Ibn Rushd confidence in reason’s ability to uncover objective and certain truths about God, humanity, and the world. Yet he firmly rejects their view of revelation as symbolic and metaphorical. For Ibn Taymiyya, revelation speaks plainly and truthfully, as a clear, factual account accessible to both scholars and laypeople. While the full reality of divine matters may lie beyond human comprehension, the language of revelation itself is direct and meaningful.

Ibn Taymiyya argues that the so-called rational ideas of philosophers and theologians are mostly imaginary and often clash with revelation. He points out, like al-Ghazālī did in Tahāfut, that these ideas even fail under close rational scrutiny. He criticizes philosophers for lowering the importance of revelation, which he sees as a serious mistake. While Ibn Taymiyya values the moral teachings of revelation, he insists its greatest gift is the deep knowledge it gives about God, the human self, and the true meaning of life.

Ibn Taymiyya saw his work as going beyond al-Ghazālī’s. While al-Ghazālī mainly attacked false ideas, Ibn Taymiyya aimed to rebuild a proper understanding by showing that pure reason agrees with revelation. He rejected much of philosophy, even its basic logic, and worked to prove two things: that true reason exists and that it supports revelation, not the ideas of the philosophers.

He believed that using figurative interpretation (taʾwīl) or leaving meanings unclear (tafwīḍ) weakens revelation. For him, these methods are not only unstable but also go against the purpose of revelation, which is to give clear and reliable knowledge about God and life. Hence he plans to end the debate on reason and revelation bu his multi-voluminous work.

The Beginning of Darʾ taʿāruḍ

In the year 1209, the Ashʿarī theologian Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī passed away, leaving behind a major idea known as the “universal rule.” This rule, accepted by many Ashʿarī scholars, tried to settle the conflict between reason and revelation. It claimed that when reason and scripture seem to disagree, reason must come first. Revelation should then be reinterpreted (taʾwīl) or its meaning left unclear (tafwīḍ). (Darʾ, 1:4)

Ibn Taymiyya strongly opposed this rule. He believed it weakened the authority of revelation, especially in matters like God’s attributes. For him, reason and revelation do not truly conflict and if they seem to, the fault lies in flawed reasoning, not in the revealed texts. Ibn Taymiyya points out that before al-Rāzī already articulated this universal rule, Ashʿaris such as al-Ghazālī, employed it in his short treatise Qānūn al-taʾwīl.

Ibn Taymiyya explains that reinterpretation of revelation usually happens in two ways: taʾwīl, which gives a new meaning to a verse based on reason, and tafwīḍ, which rejects the clear meaning but leaves the true meaning to God without explanation. He sees both as forms of changing the meaning (tabdīl) or assuming ignorance (tajhīl) and misguidance (taḍlīl).

One method, called wahm and takhyīl, treats revelation as full of images meant to guide the public morally, not to describe reality. This view says God is shown as having a body, and the afterlife is described with physical rewards and punishments, just to help ordinary people understand. Supporters of this view admit the verses mean something else but claim only God knows the real meaning—even the Prophet may not have known it. Some say the Prophet did know but chose not to explain it to the people. (Darʾ, 1:8-12)

However, given that the Prophet was commissioned to clarify the meaning of revelation to everyone so that they might be rightly guided, his failure to do so would, for IbnTaymiyya, constitute a positive act of misguidance (hence, “taḍlīl”).

Some philosophers and theologians claim that revelation, when taken literally, describes God in ways that reason says are impossible. They argue that such descriptions either break logical rules or make God seem like created things—a problem known as tashbīh (likening).

To avoid this, the “universal rule” says reason must come first, and revelation should be reinterpreted. One example is the Ismāʿīlī thinker Abū Yaʿqūb al-Sijistānī, who denied many divine attributes to avoid tashbīh.(Darʾ, 5:323) Ibn Taymiyya criticizes this approach, saying it leads to extreme negation. He explains that once people accept the idea of figurative interpretation (taʾwīl) to avoid tashbīh, they risk rejecting even basic attributes like God being Living, All-Knowing, or All-Powerful—since all such traits could be seen as resembling creation.

Ibn Taymiyya then criticized philosophical view that divides all things whether living or simply existent into two categories: eternal and originated in time. He argues that using the same basis of division for both God and the universe implies a structural similarity between them. This, he warns, leads to a dangerous form of assimilation (likening the creature with Him), suggesting that God and created things are alike simply because they both fall under the label of “existence.” If God is eternal and the universe is not, yet both are called “existent,” then they are wrongly made to resemble each other through this shared term.

The problem deepens when philosophers claim that God, unlike other existent things, is necessary by virtue of Himself. This implies that God is composed of two aspects: the general trait He shares with other things (existence), and the unique trait that sets Him apart (necessity). But reason dictates that anything composed of parts whether physical or conceptual is dependent on those parts. And anything dependent cannot be truly necessary or eternal.

Ibn Taymiyya rejects philosophical reasoning that leads to God being “composed” of abstract traits like existence and necessity. He insists God is absolutely simple and self-sufficient. Yet, he affirms attributes like “hand” and “face” because they are scripturally revealed not because they imply parts or physicality. His method is to affirm without likening (tashbīh) and without denying (taʿṭīl).

Ibn Taymiyya argues that extreme negationists, like the Bāṭiniyya, lead others into denying even the basic truth that God exists—something reason clearly confirms. In trying to avoid likening God to creation (tashbīh), they say God is neither “existent” nor “living,” but this only makes things worse. Now, instead of resembling created things, God is made to resemble non-existence itself. This, Ibn Taymiyya concludes, is the ultimate position of the atheists (malāḥida).

For Ibn Taymiyya, this approach leads to a dangerous pattern: it weakens the clear meaning of revelation and replaces it with human reasoning. He believes this is the inevitable result of following the “universal rule” and relying on taʾwīl (figurative interpretation).

Argument Nine : False Remaining And It's Problem - (Darʾ, 1:156–170)

If negating certain scriptural meanings is based on a consistent use of reason, then we must ask: is there any alternative besides interpreting these passages metaphorically (taʾwīl) or suspending judgment (tafwīḍ) in order to preserve rational coherence? Ibn Taymiyya answers yes—and devotes most of his ten-volume Darʾ taʿāruḍ al-ʿaql wa-l-naql to proving that all rational objections to a literal reading of revelation, especially verses about God and His attributes, collapse under rational scrutiny.

He begins by noting that the idea of prioritizing reason over the clear meaning of revelation is not based on any universally applicable principle. This is because theologians and philosophers often disagree with each other, even while claiming to rely on rational necessity or logical inference. For example, both those who deny certain divine attributes and those who affirm them argue from supposedly conclusive rational grounds.

The farther a school of thought strays from the Sunna, the more internal disagreement it faces about what reason actually dictates. As a result, the more a group departs from the shared affirmations of reason and revelation, the more it suffers from intellectual fragmentation and contradiction—not just in relation to scripture, but within rational thought itself.

Ibn Taymiyya shows his principle through what has been called the “Taymiyyan pyramid,” introduced early in his work. At its peak lies truth—defined as the point of unity, clarity, and certainty (yaqīn) where sound reason and authentic revelation fully align.

To expose the flawed nature of much of kalām discourse, Ibn Taymiyya cites prominent rationalist thinkers (nuẓẓār) who themselves admit the futility of their lifelong efforts to attain theological certainty through dialectical reasoning. For example, al-Shahrastānī laments:

“I have made the rounds of the gatherings of the learned,  And cast my eyes upon the haunts of erudition;  Yet never did I see but men perplexed, with their chins in their hands,  Or gnashing their teeth in regret.” (Darʾ, 1:159)

Ibn Taymiyaa also cites a two-line response to al-Shahrastānī from the latter-day Yemeni scholar Muḥammad b. Ismāʿīl b. al-Amīral-Ṣanʿānī, who retorted,

“Perhaps your rounds have missed the learned circle (maʿhad) of the Prophet, And every man of knowledge(ʿālim) who encountered him; For he who is led by the guidance of Muḥammad is never perplexed, Nor ever found gnashing his teeth in regret.”

Similarly, Ibn Taymiyya quotes al-Rāzī from Aqsām al-ladhdhāt, expressing disillusionment with speculative theology:

“Entanglement, the acme of minds’ pursuit,  Most human endeavor is but straying;  Our souls are estranged from our bodies,  The yield of our world, but harms and bane;  All we’ve gained from a lifelong research,  Is but collecting quotations and sayings.” (Darʾ, 1:160)

Al-Rāzī ultimately concludes echoing al-Ghazālī’s reflections in al-Munqidh min al-ḍalāl that neither the philosophers nor the theologians (mutakallimūn) offer a path to true knowledge.

Ibn Taymiyya compares the deep confusion and pessimism found in the writings of many philosophers and theologians with the calm confidence of those who follow the original prophetic path revealed in scripture. These followers, he says, can easily see the flaws in speculative doctrines because they rely on what he calls “pure natural reason,” which always agrees with authentic revelation. (Darʾ, 1:164)

In Ibn Taymiyya’s view, the way philosophers and theologians use reason often leads to distorted interpretations of scripture. So, what’s the solution?

His main goal in Darʾ taʿāruḍ al-ʿaql wa-l-naql is to challenge and dismantle the idea that reason should always take priority over revelation. He believes this idea—the “universal rule”—is the root cause of the intellectual and religious confusion of his time. To refute it, he presents about thirty-eight separate arguments, mostly found in volumes 1 and 5 of the Darʾ. These arguments aren’t arranged in a strict order but are offered as individual critiques.

For clarity, these arguments can be grouped into themes:

The first section focus on specific criticisms that aim to reshape how people think about reason and revelation. Next section includes broader arguments against the logical soundness of the universal rule. And last section presents scriptural evidence that challenges the rule directly.

Interestingly, six of the forty-four entries in the Darʾ aren’t arguments at all, but long discussions on complex philosophical and theological issues and will be ignored here.

Reason As The Basis For Understanding Revelation

This section describes, Arguments 3 (Darʾ, 1:87–133), 24 (5:214–216), and 29 (5:268–286). Here Ibn Taymiyya challenges the common idea that reason must come before revelation. Some who argue that if we trust revelation more than reason, we’re rejecting the very tool, "reason" that helps us know revelation is true. They say reason is what supports revelation, not in its existence, but in how we understand and accept it.

But Ibn Taymiyya disagrees. He believes that revelation and reason can work together, and that sound reason will never truly conflict with authentic revelation. So, we don’t have to choose one over the other.

And Ibn Taymiyya says that it's not necessarily true that reason is always right to judge revelation. Yes, we use reason to understand and accept revelation, but not everything we think we know through reason is reliable or relevant. What matters is only the kind of reasoning that helps us recognize the truth of revelation like knowing that God exists or that the Prophet Muhammad was truthful, shown through miracles and other signs.

The mistake, Ibn Taymiyya says, is that people treat all rational knowledge as equally valid or invalid. In reality, we don’t need every conclusion from reason to be true. We only need the specific rational insights that support the truth of revelation—not the ones that go against it. (See Dar 1:87-91)

Ibn Taymiyya states that belief in God’s existence, the truth of prophecy, and the possibility of miracles can be verified through reason. This shows that, he used reason to confirm Islam's core claims.

This insight, recently supported by scholar Frank Griffel, challenges the earlier claim by Nicholas Heer, who argued that Ibn Taymiyya, as a Ḥanbalī traditionalist, rejected the use of reason in validating scripture. Heer seems to have overlooked the fact that Ibn Taymiyya actually used reasoning in hid works. (See, Ibn Taymiyya and His Ashʿarite Opponents, 36–37)

In fact, Ibn Taymiyya says that revelation itself contains and promotes rational reasoning. His goal is to reclaim the authority of reason not for speculative philosophy or dialectical theology, but for the Qurʾān and the prophetic tradition.

Ibn Taymiyya considers a potential objection to his argument. He argues that the truth of revelation depends not on the infallibility of reason itself, but only on the accuracy of reason's specific judgments about the authenticity of revelation.

The objection thus suggests that, you don't have to blindly accept all rational conclusions as superior to revelation. You only need to accept the rational conclusions that have verified the authenticity of revelation in the first place.

He argues that the so-called "rational conclusions" that are said to contradict revelation are not actually part of the valid rational knowledge that forms the basis for determining the authenticity of revelation. In other words, any "rational" conclusions that seem to oppose revelation are not truly part of the rational judgments that establish the validity of revelation in the first place.

Therefore, Ibn Taymiyya concludes that challenging or rejecting these particular "rational" conclusions does not actually undermine the foundations of revelation. This is because these conclusions are not truly part of the rational knowledge that supports the authenticity of revelation.

Ibn Taymiyya says that revelation itself contains many rational arguments for the existence and power of the Creator, as well as evidence that corroborates the truthfulness of the Prophet.

According to Ibn Taymiyya, what revelation affirms about these matters does not contradict, but rather aligns with, the rational foundations upon which we come to know the authenticity of revelation.

Furthermore, Ibn Taymiyya claims that revelation provides far more numerous and compelling rational arguments for such matters than what is found in the works of the rationalists themselves.

Even those who believe that knowledge of the Creator can only be attained through rational inference (rather than innate intuition) know that there are some conclusive methods that do not contradict what is affirmed in the revelations.

In fact, Ibn Taymiyya notes that even al-Rāzī, agrees with this point, as evidenced by a passage in his work Nihāyat al-ʿuqūl. (Darʾ, 1:96)

Finally Ibn Taymiyaa states, if reason and revelation contradict, revelation takes priority. This is because reason has already affirmed revelation's total truthfulness. Conversely, revelation does not certify all of reason's findings as true, nor does our certainty of revelation's authenticity depend on every individual conclusion of various reasons. (Darʾ, 1:138)

This position, says Ibn Taymiyya, is better advised (awjah) than the previous position (that of granting blanket priority to reason over revelation) since reason indicates the truth of revelation in a general and unconditional manner (dalāla ʿāmma muṭlaqa).

An example to understand this argument is let's suppose, Zaid ( who represents reason) knows a reliable mufti (Islamic legal scholar - suppose represents revelation knowledge) and refers his friend Abid to him for legal advice. Even if Zaid later disagrees with the mufti's ruling on a particular legal matter, Abid is still obligated to follow the mufti's opinion over Zaid's. This is because Zaid has already established the mufti's competence, and by doing so, has created a general obligation for Abid to follow the mufti's judgments on legal matters.

Abid's acceptance of Zaid's assessment of the mufti's competence does not mean he must accept Zaid's opinion on all matters. Similarly, Zaid's disagreement with the mufti does not mean Zaid was wrong in his initial assessment of the mufti's competence. This is because Zaid's ability to recognize the mufti's competence does not require him to have the same level of legal expertise as the mufti.

In other words, Abid is bound to follow the mufti's rulings, even though the mufti may disagree with Zaid, because Zaid has already confirmed for the mufti's reliability. Abid's obligation to the mufti's judgment takes precedence over Zaid's personal disagreement with the mufti.

Ibn Taymiyya concludes that the principle by which all agree that Abid is obliged to hold the opinion of the mufti in higher esteem than that of Zaid on discrete legal points is even more applicable with regard to granting priority to the words of an infallible prophet over the conclusions of one's own decidedly fallible reasoning.

[The actual Taymiyyan story have character Zaid and Amr, which I did modified so you can remeber it easily. - Darʾ, 1:138]

Ibn Taymiyya says prophets are far above even the smartest philosopher, like a master vs. a beginner, but even more. You can learn a skill, but you can't become a prophet; it's a gift from God - hence you can't bypass him. Just like we trust doctors even when their advice feels wrong, we should trust prophets even more because they speak truth from God. (Darʾ, 1:141)

Ibn Taymiyy says that according to him the Prophet would not have accepted the idea that reason should prevail over divine revelation. If this were allowed, then anyone could object to any part of the revealed teachings of Islam. This is because people have different intellectual abilities, and there are many potential objections that could be raised against any given belief or doctrine. Additionally, Satan constantly tries to sow doubt and uncertainty in people's minds.

The Importance of Conclusiveness - Argument 1 & 15

Ibn Taymiyya’s refutation of the universal rule consists in showing the falseness of its premises, especially the last one which is his attempt to prove the falsity of belief that there exists an actual contradiction between reason and revelation is the mission of the entire Darʾ taʿāruḍ. The following discussion on Conclusiveness of Evidence describes Arguments 1 (Darʾ, 1:37–87).

So let's focus on the next belief of Universal Rule that, the possible options for dealing with the alleged contradiction are limited to the following four: (a) accepting both contradictory statements simultaneously, (b) rejecting both simultaneously, (c) prioritizing revelation over reason, or (d) prioritizing reason over revelation.

Ibn Taymiyya doesn’t accept the idea that there are only four fixed ways to handle conflicts between reason and revelation.

The original idea suggests there is a four-fold division of these indicants (i.e evidence):

• Scriptural (based on religious texts) and conclusive (certain)
• Scriptural and inconclusive (uncertain)
• Rational (based on reason) and conclusive
• Rational and inconclusive

Specifically, Ibn Taymiyya explains that in some cases, a given indicant (whether scriptural or rational) may take priority over the others. The scriptural indicant may take precedence in certain instances, while the rational indicant may be more important in other cases.

The key point he makes is that when two indicants (evidence) contradict each other, it must be the case that:

• They are both conclusive (certain)
• They are both inconclusive (uncertain)
• One is conclusive and the other is inconclusive

Thus he is suggests that the four-fold division proposed in the original premise of Razi's Universal Rule is too simplistic and this is evident as it seems that the relationship between different types of evidence as more flexible, where the priority given to scriptural versus rational indicants can vary depending on the specific context and circumstances.

If two pieces of evidence (here reason and revelation) are truly certain they can’t actually contradict each other. That’s because real contradictions between two certain truths would break the basic rule of logic: the law of non-contradiction, which says something can’t be both true and false at the same time.

So, if it looks like two of them (reason and revelation or reason vs reason or revelation vs revelation) disagree, Ibn Taymiyya says there are only two possibilities: either one of them isn’t actually certain, or they don’t really contradict each other once we understand them properly.

Ibn Taymiyya then says, that if one piece of evidence is clearly certain and the other is not, then everyone agrees we should follow the certain one—whether it comes from reason or revelation—because certainty is always stronger than probability.

If both pieces of evidence are uncertain (ẓannī), then we should look at which one is more convincing or has stronger support (rājiḥ), and follow that one. Again, it doesn’t matter whether it’s based on reason or scripture.

So, Ibn Taymiyya rejects the idea that we must always give priority to either reason or revelation. Instead, he says we should follow whichever evidence is stronger, either because it’s certain or because it’s more persuasive. That, he argues, is the right approach.

Ibn Taymiyya says the only real objection to "Universal Rule" would be the claim that scriptural evidence can never be fully certain. That’s exactly what the theologian al-Rāzī believed. He argued that you can’t build the foundations of theology with absolute certainty using scripture alone, because understanding scripture always depends on things that are uncertain.

These uncertain factors, according to al-Rāzī, include how language is passed down—like grammar, word meanings, and sentence structure. He also points to things like figurative language, hidden meanings, words with multiple meanings, narrowing down general terms, and shifts in meaning. On top of that, he says we must also make sure there’s no valid rational objection to the apparent meaning of the text. (al-Rāzī, Asās, 234–235)

Hence Al-Rāzī argues that we can never be sure there’s no valid rational objection to a Qur’anic verse or hadith. He says it’s always possible that a strong rational argument exists—it just hasn’t occurred to the person reading the text yet.

Ibn Taymiyya disagrees here, he mentions that he had already responded to this idea in a work decades before [entitled Sharḥ awwal al-Muḥaṣṣal] showing that revelation can, in fact, lead to certainty.

Even if we accept al-Rāzī’s view for the sake of argument, Ibn Taymiyya says it doesn’t help. That’s because the reason we would give priority to a rational argument is not because it’s rational, but because it’s conclusive. The real issue is certainty, not the source of the evidence.

People who follow the “Universal Rule” claim that reason should come first because it supposedly supports revelation. But Ibn Taymiyya says this reasoning doesn’t hold up. What matters is whether the evidence is certain or not. If one piece of evidence is certain and the other is uncertain, we should always follow the certain one - no matter where it comes from. So Ibn Taymiyya simply says this rule is noy based on conclusive rationality.

And finally, Ibn Taymiyya says trying to prove that scriptural evidence can never be conclusive is impossible.

In his view, the foundational tenets of Islam such as the oneness of God, the obligation of worship, and the reality of resurrection are not merely doctrinal claims but truths known necessarily to be part of the religion (maʿlūm bil-iḍṭirār min al-dīn). Denying them would amount to rejecting the very authenticity of the Prophet’s message and, by extension, the revelation itself.

So if someone were to claim that a definitive rational proof contradicts one of these established fundamentals, and that reason must therefore take precedence over revelation, such a stance would be universally recognized as disbelief. He insists that it is impossible for a sound rational proof to contradict a conclusive scriptural proof. Any apparent contradiction, he maintains, must stem from a misinterpretation of either the rational argument or the scriptural text.

Ibn Taymiyya presents two related arguments based on a common issue in legal discussions of revelation here: the distinction between the authenticity (thubūt) of the texts and their meaning (dalāla). His first argument begins with a simple premise: either a person knows—through reason—that the Prophet’s mission is authentic and that what he conveyed is factually true, or he does not.

If someone does not have certain knowledge that revelation is authentic, then there can be no real conflict between what revelation says and any rational conclusion he holds with certainty. In such a case, the rational conclusion would take precedence, because the revelation is not known to be definitively true. On the other hand, if the rational conclusion itself is uncertain, then no contradiction can exist either—since two unknowns cannot truly conflict.

But if the mind knows with certainty that revelation is authentic, and also knows that revelation affirms a particular proposition, then the truth of that proposition is necessarily established. Just like in logic, when both premises are known to be true, the conclusion must also be true. Thus, for Ibn Taymiyya, certainty in revelation and its affirmations leads directly to certainty in the truths it conveys.

And if we follow "Universal Rule" it would eventually undermine our confidence in anything revelation may assert. The result of all this is that people who approach the texts in such a manner do not gain any knowledge from them about the attributes of God and unseen. Because they believe that such statements contain some elements whose obvious meanings are inapplicable and, consequently, subject to figurative interpretation through taʾwīl.

Then, Ibn Taymiyya deepens his argument by addressing a common objection: that contradictions between reason and revelation only arise when one side is mistakenly assumed to be valid. He also accepts that what some call “scriptural indicants” may not actually be reliable proofs either because the transmission chain (isnād) is flawed or because the content (matn) is ambiguous. Similarly, what some call “rational indicants” may also fail to meet the standard of true proof, especially if they are based on conjecture rather than certainty.

In this light, Ibn Taymiyya argues that if a supposed rational proof contradicts a scriptural text that is both well-transmitted and clearly meaningful, then the rational proof must be re-examined. If it turns out to be merely speculative, it cannot override the scriptural proof. The priority given to revelation in such cases is not because it is revelation per se, but because it carries greater epistemic certainty. For Ibn Taymiyya, the hierarchy of knowledge is determined by the strength and clarity of the evidence not by whether it comes from reason or scripture. It is therefore invalid to accord automatic priority to an entire category.

He argues that once the authenticity (thubūt) of revelation is established, the next step is to assess its signification (dalāla), whether revelation clearly and definitively addresses the issue in question. From this, he outlines three possible scenarios:

1. Revelation definitively affirms the issue: In this case, it is impossible for reason to contradict what is already known to be true. If something is known whether through revelation or reason to exist or not exist, then no valid proof can oppose it.

2. Revelation only conjecturally affirms the issue: Here, a rational proof could potentially contradict the scriptural claim. If that happens, priority must be given to what is known over what is merely speculated, not because reason is superior to revelation, but because certainty is superior to conjecture. Likewise, if revelation provides certainty and reason only offers speculation, revelation takes precedence.

3. Revelation neither affirms nor suggests anything about the issue: Then there is no basis for contradiction at all, since revelation has not made any claim on the matter.

From this framework, Ibn Taymiyya concludes that giving automatic priority to reason or even to revelation in every case is unjustified.

Ibn Taymiyya argues that the real issue isn’t whether reason or revelation should come first it’s about whether something is known with certainty or just guessed.

In the end this argument, Ibn Taymiyya replaces the old debate of “reason vs. revelation” with a smarter one: certainty vs. probability. What matters most is how strong the evidence is, not where it comes from.

Rational and Scriptural Innovations

Now as Ibn Taymiyya had argued that the key importance in evaluating arguments is not between reason and revelation as separate categories, but between knowledge and conjecture. This shift has direct consequences for how we assess the epistemological strength (or validity) and religious-moral value of different proofs. In Argument 15, he introduces a deeper framework for the entire debate around reason and revelation.

So for him the true distinction lies between proofs that are scripturally validated (sharʿī - real revelations & right reason) and those that are innovated (bidʿī - forged hadiths and conjectured reason). Importantly, scripturally validated proofs include both revealed (samʿī) and rational (ʿaqlī) evidences. This means that reason, when properly grounded, can be part of legitimate religious knowledge.

But a proof (of reason) is considered scripturally valid if revelation either affirms it's truth directly or allows it as a legitimate method or conclusion. This means that rational arguments can be part of religious knowledge, if they are supported or approved by revelation.

Being scripturally validated (sharʿī) is a positive attribute of a proof, whereas being innovated (bidʿī) i.e, scriptural validation is a negative qualification.

If the term “scriptural” (sharʿī) is understood in its primary sense, namely, as referring to that which has been positively affirmed and indicated by revelatio, then it is possible for a given proof or indicant to also be accessible through reason. In such cases, the role of scripture is to highlight and draw attention to a truth that reason can independently grasp. This type of proof is classified as a “scripturally validated rational” (sharʿī-ʿaqlī) indicant. Several examples of this category, including the parables (amthāl) found in the Qurʾān, rational arguments for the oneness of God, the authenticity of the Prophet Muḥammad, and the affirmation of divine attributes. These are all truths that can be established through rational demonstration and syllogistic reasoning (barāhīn wa-maqāyīs ʿaqliyya), yet they are also validated by scripture through explicit mention and affirmation.

By contrast, if a proof is known solely through revelation and cannot be established by reason alone, it is classified as a “scripturally validated revealed” (sharʿī-samʿī) indicant. Examples of this include textual proofs from the Qurʾān or ḥadīth that affirm realities such as the Day of Judgment or other metaphysical events that lie beyond the reach of human reason. In summary, all valid religious proofs may be categorized into two types: those that are scripturally validated and rational (sharʿī-ʿaqlī), and those that are scripturally validated and revealed (sharʿī-samʿī). (Darʾ, 1:198)

Ibn Taymiyya critiques a common assumption among many kalām theologians that scriptural indicants (adilla sharʿiyya) refer only to those truths which are exclusively known through revelation [what he calls sharʿī-samʿī indicants]. These scholars argue that revelation is solely to inform us of matters inaccessible to reason, such as the Day of Judgment or details of the unseen. As a result, they divide the foundations of theology (uṣūl al-dīn) into two distinct categories: rational and scriptural. The rational is defined as what cannot be known through revelation, and the scriptural as what cannot be known through reason.

Ibn Taymiyya rejects this binary. He argues that the Qurʾān itself employs and highlights rational proofs, demonstrating that revelation does not merely inform but also guides reason. For instance, he cites Qurʾān 41:53: “We shall show them Our signs in the horizons and in themselves until it becomes clear to them that it is the Truth.” This verse, according to Ibn Taymiyya, presents a rational argument for the existence of God based on empirical observation of nature and beauty of the world.

Furthermore, if we understand “scriptural” (sharʿī) in the sense what it affrims and what it permits, Ibn Taymiyya divided it into three subcategories:

• Authenticated Prophetic Sunna
• Rational proofs indicated and highlighted by the Qurʾan
• Empirical observations of existing things (al-mawjūdāt), validated by scripture through its encouragement to reflect on creation

In the end, Ibn Taymiyya is offers a new way to think about proofs. Instead of dividing them into “scriptural” vs. “rational,” he says the real difference is between valid proofs (which are supported by scripture and reason) and invalid ones (which are made up or misleading). Thus what he did is blurring the distinction between right reason and revelation, trying to make them closer.

So a quick review, Ibn Taymiyya's three key moves are:

1. He breaks down the strict divide between reason and revelation, treating each individual idea—whether from logic or scripture—as something that should be judged on its own merit.
2. He shifts the focus from asking “Is this from reason or revelation?” to asking “Is this certain knowledge or just probable?” For things that are only probable, he further asks whether they are more convincing or less convincing.
3. He includes sound rational arguments under the category of scripturally validated proofs. And further made distinction between valid and innivated (reason and revelation).

Other Taymiyyan Arguments Against Universal Rule

In most of his Argument 8 Ibn Taymiyya says, that most of the supposed conflicts between reason and revelation come from topics that are very complex and unclear even for many rationalist thinkers. These include matters like God’s names and attributes and his Unseen World. People who try to understand these issues using only their own reasoning often end up confused or in disagreement with one another.

He says many of these thinkers blindly follow the major figures of their philosophical schools, even when their own reasoning leads them to different conclusions. For example, followers of Aristotle sometimes reach different ideas in fields like logic, physics, and metaphysics. But instead of questioning Aristotle’s teachings, they assume the problem lies with themselves that they aren’t intelligent enough to grasp his ideas.

Ibn Taymiyya adds that people of sound intellect—those truly gifted with clear reasoning (ahl al-ʿaql al-muttaṣifūna bi-ṣarīḥ al-ʿaql), recognize that the science of logic itself contains many obvious and undeniable errors. He points out that the views of Aristotle and his followers like Alexander of Aphrodisias, Proclus, Themistius, al-Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā, al-Suhrawardī, and Ibn Rushd—especially in metaphysics (ilāhiyyāt), are filled with serious mistakes and major flaws.

Furthermore the habit of blindly following authority isn’t just found in Greek philosophy, it’s also common among many Muslim scholars and schools of thought. This includes groups like the Muʿtazilīs, Ashʿarīs, Karrāmiyya, the followers of the Four Imams and Sufi figures. He argues that many of their teachings not only go against the Qurʾān, the Prophet’s teachings (Sunna), and ijma', but also contradict clear and sound reasoning.

Despite this, their followers rarely question their leaders’ views—even when their own thinking leads them to different conclusions. (See, Darʾ, 1:148–156)

Ibn Taymiyya says in his Argument 11 that many things people call “proofs” whether based on reason or scripture aren’t actually solid proofs. They’re just assumptions that people think (and thus) count as evidence.

The real disagreement, he explains, is about whether reason demands that these revealed texts be interpreted in a metaphorical or non-literal way different from their plain meaning. But Ibn Taymiyya points out that rational thinkers themselves disagree widely on what counts as valid knowledge. So, if the clear meaning of revelation is agreed upon, it shouldn’t be challenged by rational conclusions that are uncertain and debated.

Thus people of truth don’t reject reason or rational proofs as a whole. They only reject claims which are (obviously not backed by solid reasoning) said to contradict revelation. (Darʾ, 1:192–194)

In his Argument 12 Ibn Taymiyya argues that any claim made by reason that seems to contradict revelation can actually be shown by reason itself to be false. If something is proven to be invalid through rational thinking, then it can't be used to challenge other rational conclusions, and certainly not to challenge revelation. He promises to explain it further when he examines the specific arguments. (Darʾ, 1:194)

In Argument 13, Ibn Taymiyya explains that certain parts of revelation—like belief in God’s attributes, the events of the afterlife, and other unseen matters are clearly and necessarily known to be part of Islam. These are not optional beliefs or minor details; they are core teachings that every Muslim recognizes.

So, if someone accepts that the revelation brought is authentic, it doesn’t make sense for them to reject these teachings. Therefore, it’s not reasonable to claim that these parts of revelation are false just because they seem to conflict with certain rational ideas. (Darʾ, 1:195)

In Argument 14, Ibn Taymiyya explains that not only the words of the Qur’an, but also its meanings and the Prophet’s intentions and goals and prayers have been passed down through reliable and widespread transmission (mutawātir) and this principle applies across many fields, like Qur’anic exegesis, hadith studies, grammar, medicine, law, and theology. From a knowledge standpoint, anything passed down through mutawātir transmission is considered certain and cannot be denied.

So, if someone makes a claim about the meaning of revelation that goes against what trusted scholars know to be true then that claim must be false. Reliable transmission gives us certainty, and anything that contradicts it doesn’t hold up. (Darʾ,1:195–198)

In Argument 21, Ibn Taymiyya says it’s impossible for two clear statements in revelation to contradict each other. They may clarify or explain one another, but they don’t conflict. This is different from commands or laws in revelation, which can sometimes be replaced or canceled by later ones—what’s known as abrogation (naskh).

However, Ibn Taymiyya insists that only revelation itself can cancel or override another part of revelation. Reason or personal opinion cannot do this. Anyone who tries to change or reject parts of religion based on their own ideas is committing heresy (ilḥād). (Darʾ,5:204–209)

Arguments Against Universal Rule From The Lens Of Revelation

The Arguments we have included below are what Ibn Taymiyaa puts forward which are purely based on revelation - against the Razi's rule.

In Argument 3, Ibn Taymiyya argues that anyone with even basic knowledge of the Prophet Muhammad’s message knows without a doubt that the he never called people to faith using complex philosophical ideas. He didn’t teach abstract concepts like the denial of God’s attributes, or about the impossibility of an infinite past or future which are often discussed by philosophers and theologians (mutakallimūn).

Not only did the Prophet not teach these things, Ibn Taymiyya says, but he didn’t even hint at them. In fact, we know this with even more certainty than we know other details of his life.

If someone tries to support these philosophical ideas by using fake hadiths or twisted rational arguments, Ibn Taymiyya says that scholars who truly know the Prophet’s teachings would immediately recognize those claims as false. (Darʾ,1:87–133)

In Argument 15, Ibn Taymiyya says that Allah has clearly forbidden the use of false arguments - particularly when it comes to speaking about Him. This is shown in the Qur’anic verse: “Was not the covenant of the Book taken from them that they would ascribe nothing to Allah but the truth?” (Qur’an 7:169).

Allah S.W.T also warns against speaking without knowledge. Verses like,
“Do not pursue that of which you have no knowledge” (17:36),
“That you say of Allah what you do not know” (7:33),
and “Why do you argue about things you don’t understand?” (3:66) all emphasize this point.

Furthermore, Allah condemns arguing just for the sake of argument after the truth has already been made clear. For example, “They argue with you about the truth after it has been made manifest” (8:6), and “Those who disbelieve argue with false arguments to refute the truth” (18:56).

Ibn Taymiyya interprets these verses which were originally directed at the Meccan pagans as applying to philosophers and theologians too. He believes their arguments are weak and misleading, and that they speak about Unseen things without proper knowledge. (Darʾ,1:198–200)

In Argument 21, Ibn Taymiyya is strongly against putting human reasoning and personal opinions above revelation. He says doing so is like denying the revelations of the prophets and opens the door to disbelief. He refers to al-Shahrastānī’s famous book Kitāb al-Milal wa-l-Niḥal, which says that the root of all misguidance is preferring one’s own views and desires over what God has revealed.

Ibn Taymiyya supports this with several Qur’anic verses and explains that revelation comes in two forms:
(ikhbārī): statements about truth, such as God’s attributes or the nature of creation
(inshāʾī): commands and laws, like prayer and fasting

He says that success comes from fully believing the declarative parts and obeying the imperative ones. Misery, on the other hand, comes from rejecting either type based on personal opinion or desire.

He criticizes two groups:
The one who rejects what God says about Himself and creation based on their own reasoning And the one who ignore God’s commands and follow their own invented rules or interpretations.

Ibn Taymiyya cites Qur’anic verses and a hadith that says arguing about the Qur’an is a form of disbelief. Even if someone doesn’t openly reject revelation but holds a doubt or confusion, Ibn Taymiyya says this is still dangerous, especially if they give their own reasoning more weight than the Qur’an and Sunna.

In his view, only pure and sound reason (ʿaql ṣarīḥ) can be trusted, and it will never contradict true revelation. Any reasoning that leads to rejecting or doubting revelation is flawed and must be rejected. (Darʾ,5:204–209)

In Argument 22, Ibn Taymiyya explains that Allah S.W.T criticizes those who turn people away from His path and try to make it seem crooked. This path refers to the true religion of beliefs and commands.

He says that even someone who simply tells others not to believe in a general way is guilty of this. So it’s even worse when someone encourages people to reject revelation, claiming that their own reasoning is more reliable than it.

Ibn Taymiyya warns that if someone says “sound reason” contradicts revelation and insists that people should follow this reason instead, they are actually accusing revelation of being flawedand crooked. They’re trying to “fix” what they see as mistakes in revelation by reinterpreting it through their own logic. (Darʾ,5:210–211)

In Argument 23, Ibn Taymiyya explains that the Prophet Muhammad was sent to clearly deliver the truth and guide people to the straight path. If the plain meaning of what the Prophet taught were actually contradicted by sound reason—as some negationist thinkers claim—then the Prophet would have failed in his mission which is not the case.

So the Qur’an and the Prophet’s teachings do not support the idea of denying God’s attributes. In fact, the obvious and straightforward meaning of revelation clearly affirms these attributes.

So, if the negationists were right, it would mean the Prophet knew the truth but chose to hide it and teach the opposite. Ibn Taymiyya says this idea that the Prophet misled people is completely against the message of Islam. Hence for Ibn Taymiyya the contradiction between negationism and the Prophetic teachings is so obvious that it falls into the category of things that are “known by necessity” to be part of Islam i.e, the negationist is not even allowed to give his opinion on it. (Darʾ,5:211–214)

Conclusion

Ibn Taymiyya had argued Allah's words and the teachings of early Muslims are more important than human reasoning. He showed that many problems come from misunderstanding, not from the religion itself. He said reason and revelation can work together.

However, as I've noticed, many of the debates and arguments presented by Ibn Taymiyya need further discussion, including precise nature of scriptural interpretation, and the limits of rational inquiry along with what is conclusive reason. In our next article, we will try to understand what Taymiyya gave us after taking away "Universal Rule".

This article was based my reading of, "Ibn Taymiyya on Reason and Revelation" by Carl Sharif El-Tobgui.

Tq for your time. Allah-Hafiz!